

**REPRESENTATION TO THE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS BOUNDARIES COMMISSION**  
**BY THE ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA**

Under Section 83 of SA's *Constitution Act 1934*, the Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission is charged with attempting to ensure that a party with over 50% of the two-party preferred vote wins a majority of seats. However at the 2014 State Election, the Liberal Party won 53% of the two-party preferred vote but did not win government. This again proved that while there are single-member electorates the Boundaries Commission has an impossible task, which the Electoral Reform Society has always argued, even at the 1991 referendum to change the State's Constitution.

The Society almost predicted the distorted result this time when it made the following comments in July 2012 on the Draft Order (**Attachment 1**):

*The Draft Order now shows under the proposed boundaries, Labor winning 26 seats and Liberal 21 seats. This result is based on how South Australians voted at the last State election where Labor only gained 48.4% of the vote. Surely the boundaries should have been re-drawn to reflect this vote?*

*At the next election, there could well be a swing back to the Labor Party. If this swing was less than 1.6%, the Liberal Party could still have more than 50% of the vote and still not win a majority of seats.*

*Alternatively there could just as easily be a small swing to the Liberal Party that keeps Labor in office with only 47% of the two-party preferred vote.*

*While the Society does have difficulties with the "electoral fairness criteria," the question should still be asked – **where is the fairness in the proposed redistribution?***

After each State election, the Electoral Reform Society of South Australia prepares an analysis of the results. The 2014 analysis *Enough- It's time to change the way we elect our MPs* is included with this submission (**Attachment 2**) to reinforce that single-member electorates have failed South Australia and it is now time to consider adopting the quota-preferential method of proportional representation if this State wants to achieve electoral fairness.

The "fairness test" itself is based on the concept of the two-party preferred vote. This is an artificial measure and does not always give the 'correct' outcome particularly when there is not a direct ALP versus Liberal contest. At the 2014 Election, there were four electorates where the final two candidates were not ALP and Liberal candidates (Fisher, Frome, Heysen and Mount Gambier).

South Australians have recently had the opportunity to see that the two-party preferred vote really is meaningless. At the 2014 State Election, in the electorate of Fisher won by Independent Bob Such, a recount of the votes showed 57.2% for the Liberal Party and 42.8% for the ALP. Following the death of Mr Such, at the subsequent by-election, the ALP won with 50.02%. Given that the 'norm' is for there to be a swing against a government, a swing towards the ALP of 7.22% is astounding. But perhaps it shows that a true two-party preferred vote is only accurate if there are only the two candidates from the Liberal Party and ALP. At the State Election, Mr Such was listed first on the ballot paper and it appears that many who voted for him just continued with a donkey vote down the ballot paper to ensure their support went to him and that their votes were formal with little

thought of other preferences and how it may influence the two-party preferred vote. It was only at the by-election, without Mr Such on the ballot paper that his supporters then had to consider who they would now vote for, and as a result it was won by the ALP.

Party labels are also becoming increasingly meaningless. The decision of Martin Hamilton-Smith to become an Independent Liberal and to join the Cabinet of the Weatherill Labor Government, is a stark example of this.

At election time, electors vote for candidates to represent them for the next term in Parliament. While party status is a major determinant for electors when they chose whom to vote for, it is not the only determinant. Other factors include policies, proposals put by the candidate for the local area, residential address, marital status, gender, or even their name, as appears to have happened in Elder.

It should be noted that while a member's political label may change, usually the member's beliefs and ideals remain remarkably constant. In fact a party's policies may change far more dramatically than a member's. Currently in the South Australian Parliament, there are also other MPs who have changed political status since first being elected. Mitch Williams was initially elected as an Independent Liberal before re-joining the Liberals, while Bob Such and Rob Brokenshire both resigned from the Liberal Party to become an Independent and to be elected as a Family First MLC respectively. In none of these cases were the changes surprising and they clearly fitted in with what was known about these politicians and their values and beliefs. And yet somehow the Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission is supposed to take these into account.

As in previous representations to the Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission, the Electoral Reform Society of South Australia again suggests that the Commission recommend that the Parliament needs to consider whether single-member electorates should be scrapped.

Section 83 of the *Constitution Act 1934* authorises the Commission to have regard to any other matter it thinks relevant.

Such a recommendation is very necessary following the failure of recent redistributions.

To assist the Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission in its deliberations towards accepting this recommendation, consideration should also be given to the submission of the Proportional Representation Society of Australia to the Legislative Council Select Committee on Electoral Matters and its Inquiry into matters relating to the General Election of 15 March 2014 (see <http://www.parliament.sa.gov.au/Committees/Pages/Committees.aspx?CTId=3&CId=312>). This submission discusses "Safe seats underlie the regular distortion between votes and seats" and highlights the disparity between votes and seats particularly in metropolitan Adelaide.

Graham Pratt  
PRESIDENT

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SECRETARY

Electoral Reform Society of South Australia

14 April 2016

Attachment 1: 2012 Draft Order of the Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission

**Comments from the Electoral Reform Society of South Australia, July 2012**

The Commission is thanked for addressing the main points made in the Electoral Reform Society's submission. However it is disappointing that the Commission continues to maintain that it does not have the power to make any recommendations that may have made its task possible.

The Society remains impressed by the amount of effort the Commission continues to make in an attempt to comply with the relevant legislation for electoral redistributions in this State, particularly in relation to the "electoral fairness criteria", which this Society argues is an impossible task. But it is significant that no other Parliament has tried to copy South Australia's "electoral fairness criteria".

In this instance, the Society is not convinced that the redistribution proposed has achieved electoral "fairness."

At the hearing on 27 February, copies of the two party preferred pendulum for the 2010 election were distributed. This showed Labor winning 27 seats and Liberal 20 seats.

The Draft Order now shows under the proposed boundaries, Labor winning 26 seats and Liberal 21 seats. This result is based on how South Australians voted at the last State election where Labor only gained 48.4% of the vote. Surely the boundaries should have been re-drawn to reflect this vote?

At the next election, there could well be a swing back to the Labor Party. If this swing was less than 1.6%, the Liberal Party could still have more than 50% of the vote and still not win a majority of seats.

Alternatively there could just as easily be a small swing to the Liberal Party that keeps Labor in office with only 47% of the two-party preferred vote.

While the Society does have difficulties with the "electoral fairness criteria," the question should still be asked – **where is the fairness in the proposed redistribution?**

What needs to happen

The problem is the differential wastage of votes in super-safe seats (far worse for Liberals naturally because of Labor's rural weakness and exacerbated by Labor's campaigning strategy at the last election) and the power of incumbency after a party (almost always the Liberals in South Australia in practice in modern times) has a really bad result and is trying to regain ground.

For democratic progress to be made in South Australia, the true nature of the problems of representation and accountability in the House of Assembly must be recognised and steps taken to confront them directly:

- the continued geographic blocks of safe seats mean that party representation in the Assembly is greatly skewed compared with support bases and no government can claim to be a cross-section of all South Australia;
- the proliferation of safe seats means that throughout most of the State Assembly politics is primarily about capturing preselection within the dominant party;
- election campaigning is concentrated largely on the subset of one-third of seats in which parties anticipate there is some chance of a different outcome;
- even with the incentive of maximising the vote at Legislative Council elections, the capability of the weaker party falls to dangerously low levels in many areas, severely limiting the extent of the public political debate that can occur there;
- when a strong swing occurs against a party, there is a serious risk that its Assembly numbers will be so small that its chances of victory at the next election are written off and as it is consigned to irrelevance the aura of invincibility increases the likelihood of attempted government excesses;
- added to these inherent structural defects as a consequence of concentration of voter support are now the boundary changes after each election, making for unproductive instability for sitting members and voters.

The Commission may take the view that such vital matters are beyond the scope of its concerns and efforts. However, the nature of winner-take-all contests establishes that the task set the Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission is doomed to fail regularly no matter how actively the Commission pursues its accepted remit:

- setting aside differences in enrolments and turnout in individual electorates as a further confounding factor, single-member electorates provide the same reward for a one-vote victory achieved with a start of 25% of first preferences and a performance where 60% of first-preferences and 70% of the two-party-preferred vote is obtained;
- the crudity of the basis for reward immediately reveals the risk of a party locking up huge majorities in a small number of electorates but winning disproportionately few of the marginal contests, and so emerging with a majority of the two-party-preferred vote but a minority of seats;
- the extent of the vote in strongholds may determine who has overall two-party preference and yet that party may not do particularly well in the key marginal electorates that decide government – the Commission should produce tables on

the basis of both the 2010 outcomes and of the projected starting points under its proposed new boundaries in the safest five, ten and 15 seats for both Labor and the Liberals to grasp the magnitude of the structural problem, and then articulate why it believes that its proposal addresses this glaring imbalance; by reversing the margins in the most closely fought electorates and setting these changes off exactly against reductions in margins in the safest seats, one can generate a mirror result with the same two-party-preferred vote but a different government – as we have seen in 1989, 2002 and now 2010, when votes for the two competing forces for government are reasonably close, there can therefore be no assurance whatsoever that the party with the greater two-party-preferred support will prevail;

- the situation in which the Member for Hammond found himself after the 2002 general elections highlights the fact that the best efforts of the Commission may be over-ridden by the personal decision of one or more MPs holding the balance of power – this is all the more significant as South Australia has had more minority governments than any other State since the mid-1950s;
- the exaggerated winner-takes-all majorities of 1985, 1993 and 2006 further highlight the impossibility of the task before the Commission, as in these cases one party tends to secure all the advantages of incumbency, making it far more likely that it will hold on to government even if circumstances cause its support to be greatly eroded;
- another factor militating against confidence in such boundary-setting exercises is that in situations where a moderate number of voters want to teach the government a bit of a lesson without necessarily throwing it out, they have no way of coordinating and calibrating their judgement to achieve that end in a winner-take-all system - since 1995, there have been unexpected victories in Queensland, Victoria (perhaps twice), Western Australia (perhaps twice) and the Northern Territory where voters may have wanted to punish governments without turfing them out, but could not find a way of achieving that.

As the Commission has not done anything to square up the level of wastage in safe seats, although Labor can be expected to waste more votes than last time in its safe seats even if it is trying a sandbagging strategy in the marginals once more, there is every prospect of another “unfair” outcome (48.4% is not exactly a close-run thing, and next time it could easily be even worse). The Liberals again start liable to miss out on government if they decrease their share of the two-party preferred vote slightly but maintain majority support (for example, assume a uniform 1% swing to Labor).

Public confidence in the Commission will be shaken in the event of the Liberals at the next State election winning a majority of the vote, particularly a bigger one than in 2010, but again failing to win government.

While it has a hopeless task, if the Commission refuses to recognise this openly, it must provide a much better explanation of why its proposed boundaries fulfil the legislative criteria when the proposed boundaries clearly leave so much obvious room for another minority-supported government.

It is not enough to claim that there is a fair set of boundaries without looking at the levels of vote wastage built into all the safe seats, and doing something to make that a less onerous burden weighing upon the Liberals trying to turn majority support into majority seats. The same argument would apply if, less likely, Labor had been unable to convert majority support into government.

The Commission should certainly not be deliberately washing its hands of the serious problem without considering levels of vote wastage at all, and simply saying that it is up to the disadvantaged party to campaign more effectively.

**ENOUGH – IT'S TIME TO URGENTLY CHANGE THE WAY WE ELECT OUR MPS**

After each State election, the Electoral Reform Society of South Australia prepares an analysis of the results.

Unfortunately these analyses continue to show the same conclusions.

- **More than two out of every five voters find that their votes (or their preferences) do not elect any members to the House of Assembly.**
- **The representation of the political parties is rarely in proportion to votes received.**

**At the 2014 State election, the results were more distorted than usual.**

**Only 54.8% of South Australian electors found their votes (or preferences) electing MPs to the House of Assembly.** A massive 460,000 electors found that even though their votes were formal, these did not elect anyone – their votes were wasted.

**In terms of representation of political parties, the election has now left the ALP, with 36% of first preferences and 49% of the seats, hugely over-represented in the House of Assembly.** But even though the ALP is now very over-represented in the House of Assembly, a third of all ALP voters still found that they voted for unsuccessful candidates.

At times, when there was a distorted result, the Government of the day has implemented changes such as:

- in 1976, providing for equal electorates within a 10% margin, and
- in 1991, changing the State's constitution to allow for a redistribution after every election and making changes to the criteria used in deciding where the boundaries should be drawn.

However, nothing happened after the 2010 results, and previously to that the Rann Government in its first term did not proceed with the findings from the Constitutional Convention.

**The 2014 State election has been one of the worse elections since 1975 in terms of the number of wasted votes, and particularly distortion in the representation of the political parties.**

The Electoral Reform Society believes that any redistribution with single-member electorates is virtually a waste of time. This has certainly been reinforced at the 2014 State election, even though all electorates had almost the same number of voters (all within the 10% margin).

For the House of Assembly, the following analysis sets out in detail:

- Voter effectiveness since 1975 (Table 1)
- Summary of the results (Table 2)
- Value of each vote (Table 3)
- A method that could be adopted to make votes more nearly equal in value (Tables 4 and 5).

This analysis is presented to show the shortcomings of the single-member electorate system, even with equal enrolments, a redistribution after every election, and the 'fairness' clause.

There is now an urgent need to change to the quota-preferential method of proportional representation and multi-member electorates (described in Appendix 1 and 2). After examining various electoral methods, the Electoral Reform Society of South Australia believes that only the introduction of such an electoral system can give true electoral justice for all South Australian voters.

## Legislative Council

In contrast to the House of Assembly, the quota-preferential method of proportional representation was used to elect 11 members of the Legislative Council, and as expected not only did the parties win seats more in proportion to votes won, but also 94% of South Australian voters saw their votes elect candidates.

Unfortunately there are a number of defects in the procedures for electing Legislative Councillors, which have yet to be corrected. While the State Government appears to be no longer committed to holding a referendum on whether South Australians want to abolish or reform the Legislative Council, the following changes are still required:

- *Optional preferential voting*

Currently voters have the choice of voting for a single party and accepting the party's preferences (by voting above the line), or of voting full preferences (voting below the line).

Voting should be OPTIONAL preferential. Those who want to make their own choices should not be forced to mark preferences if they do not have any knowledge of some of the candidates (there were 63 candidates in 25 groups at this election). If a voter has a preference for only one candidate, or several candidates, then that voter should be allowed to vote accordingly, and not forced to give preferences to all candidates.

- *Robson rotation*

At the moment, political parties decide the order of their candidates on the ballot paper. This gives a very unfair advantage to those at the top of each list.

The Robson rotation should be used. This is a process of rotating candidates' names within a column so that favoured positions (top and bottom) are shared equally between all candidates. This means much greater public accountability because candidates within each group or political party have to compete against each other for the votes from that party's supporters.

- *Recounts to fill casual vacancies*

Currently Parliament, not the voters, decides who fills any casual vacancies. If the voters' wishes - as expressed at the initial election for the vacating member - are to be reflected, the quota of votes that elected the vacating member should be recounted to ascertain whom the voters next preferred.

- *Changes in the method of transferring votes*

In calculating transfer values, rather than transferring proportions of the votes at their existing values, under the current legislation the surplus is crudely averaged over all ballot papers that helped to elect a candidate. This can lead to significant distortions affecting the further order of election.

In addition, any non-transferable papers should be placed fully within the elected candidate's quota, to minimise the exhaustion of votes.

- *More education and publicity about what it means if an elector votes above the line.*

The Electoral Reform Society would prefer that above the line voting was eliminated. It unnecessarily complicates the ballot paper and detracts from the otherwise-simple message that the marking of preferences is an instruction to electoral officials about the order in which candidates may be assisted by a particular vote. If above the line voting is continued, all electors need to be provided in advance with details of where preferences flow if they vote for a particular group's ticket. Fortunately for the first time the Electoral Commission SA provided a blank sample ballot paper on its website so that those planning to vote below the line could work out how they wanted to mark preferences so that they could take this with them when they went to vote.



**Table 1: Voter effectiveness**

<u>Election</u>	<u>Percentage of total votes that elected MPs*</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1975	58.5%	
<i>First redistribution (providing for equal electorates within a 10% margin).</i>		
1977	61.3%	4 electorates were outside the 10% margin.
1979	58.5%	8 electorates were outside the 10% margin.
1982	58.3%	16 electorates were outside the 10% margin.
<i>Redistribution</i>		
1985	58.1%	2 electorates were outside the 10% margin.
1989	56.7%	12 electorates were outside the 10% margin.
<i>Redistribution</i>		
1993	58.0%	All electorates were inside the 10% distribution.
<i>Redistribution</i>		
1997	54.8%	All electorates were inside the 10% margin.
<i>Redistribution</i>		
2002	54.6%	All electorates were inside the 10% margin.
<i>Redistribution</i>		
2006	56.3%	All electorates were inside the 10% margin.
<i>Redistribution</i>		
2010	54.5%	All electorates were inside the 10% margin.
<i>Redistribution</i>		
2014	54.8%	All electorates were inside the 10% margin.

- Percentage of total votes that elected MPs is calculated by adding the votes that actually elected MPs (first preferences plus, where necessary, preferences to elect a winner) and expressing this total as a percentage of total formal votes cast.

**Table 2: Summary of the results, House of Assembly elections, 15 March 2014**

	ALP	LIB	GRN	FF	OTHER	TOTAL
Votes for parties	364,420	455,797	88,600	63,575	45,464	1,017,856
Percentage for parties	35.8%	44.8%	8.7%	6.2%	4.4%	
Seats corresponding to votes	17	21	4	3	2	47
Seats actually won	23	22	0	0	2	47
Seats where first preferences highest	21	24	0	0	2	47
Seats with proportional representation (1 x 47-member)	17	21	4	3	2	47
(7 x 7-member)*	19	25	2	1	2	49*
(9 x 5-member)*	19	22	2	0	2	45*
Votes for elected candidates	231,631	266,315	0	0	19,380	517,326
Votes for unelected candidates (A)	132,789	189,482	88,600	63,575	26,084	500,530
% of votes for elected candidates	63.6%	58.4%	0	0	42.6%	50.8%
% of votes for unelected candidates	36.4%	41.6%	100%	100%	57.3%	49.2%
Surplus votes in seats won outright (B)	5,440	29,082	0	0	0	34,522
Deficit votes won on preferences (C)	18,247	4,105	0	0	3,819	26,171
Net wastage (A+B-C)	119,982	214,459	88,600	63,575	22,265	508,881
Effective votes (Total - net wastage)	244,438	241,338	0	0	23,199	508,975
<b>Percentage of votes effective</b>	67.1%	52.9%	0.0%	0.0%	51.0%	50.0%

\* Under South Australia's legislation, all electorates must return the same number of members, thus the divergence from the present 47 members.

**Table 3: The value of each vote**

(With 47 single-member electorates, House of Assembly elections, 15 March, 2014)

**(A) Election results (after distribution of necessary preferences)**

Electorate	Effective votes			Ineffective votes					TOTAL
	ALP	LIB	OTHER	ALP	LIB	GRN	FF	OTHER	
Adelaide*		11341		10313					21654
Ashford*	11247				10427				21674
Bragg		15033		4958		2891			22882
Bright**		11225		8679		2300			22204
Chaffey		14196		3615		1199	2891		21901
Cheltenham	12060				6414	1831	1470		21775
Colton*	11938				11262				23200
Croydon	11872				5462	2342	866		20542
Davenport		11581		6498		3468	1158		22705
Dunstan		10978		7881		2465		624	21948
Elder*	10945				10168				21113
Enfield**	10052				7419	2406			19877
Finniss		11674		5166		2883	2361		22084
Fisher*			13951		9554				23505
Flinders		14994		3214		1299	1313		20820
Florey*	10755				9739				20494
Frome*			13451		9440				22891
Giles	9800				7134	942	1196		19072
Goyder		11968		6394		744	1633	1542	22281
Hammond		11469		5314		1458	1654	912	20807
Hartley*		11217		10183					21400
Heysen		12768		4527		4527		1192	23014
Kaurna*	11740				8624				20364
Kavel		12116		4838		3481	1854		22289
Lee*	12530				10466				22996
Light*	11334				10144				21478
LittlePara**	11269				7825		2817		21911
MacKillop		13794		3117		1207	1596	1505	21219
Mawson**	10769				8260		2436		21465
Mitchell*		11161		10656					21817
Morialta		12419		7162	2033	1357			22971
Morphett		12164		5973		2128	808		21073
Mt Gambier		11100		2338		1031	1095	5872	21436
Napier**	10623				6442		3293		20358
Newland*	11394				10763				22157
Playford	11352				6779	1426	2052		21609
Port Adelaide	11760				7330	1815	1783		22688
Ramsay	11283				4988	1483	2347		20101
Reynell**	11445				6778		2778		21001

Schubert		11922		5180		2221	2713		22036
Stuart		13806		5051		1035	1128		21020
Taylor	10723				6542	1448	2309		21022
Torrens*	10958				9517				20475
Unley		12312		6429		2481		854	22076
Waite		12585		6239		2639	868	652	22983
West Torrens**	10573				7608	2723			20904
Wright*	11965				10599				22564
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>258387</b>	<b>271823</b>	<b>27402</b>	<b>133725</b>	<b>211717</b>	<b>57230</b>	<b>44419</b>	<b>13153</b>	<b>1017856</b>

GRAND TOTAL 557612 460244

In 25 electorates it was not necessary to distribute any preferences. In those electorates marked with a \*, it was necessary to distribute all preferences to elect candidates (15 electorates) and in those marked with \*\* only a partial distribution of preferences was required (7 electorates).

#### (B) Voter representation

The election results listed in (A) can be summarised:

Party	Total	Effective votes	Ineffective votes	
ALP	392112	258387	133725	34.10%
LIB	483540	271823	211717	43.78%
OTHER	142204	27402	114802	80.73%
- GRN	57230	0	57230	100.00%
- FF	44419	0	44419	100.00%
- D4D	3322	0	3322	100.00%
- NP	1328	0	1328	100.00%
- IND	35905	27402	8503	23.68%
Whole State	1017856	557612	460244	45.22%
<b>Effective</b>	<b>54.78%</b>			
<b>Wasted votes</b>	<b>45.22%</b>			

#### (C) Party representation

The election results listed in (A) also shows the following:

Party	% of total vote	Corresponding proportion of seats	Seats actually won	
ALP	38.52%	18.11	18	38.3%
LIB	47.51%	22.33	22	46.8%
OTHER	13.97%	6.57	7	14.9%
- GRN	5.62%	2.64	3	6.4%
- FF	4.36%	2.05	2	4.3%
- D4D	0.33%	0.15		0.0%
- IND	3.53%	1.66	2	4.3%
			2	4.26%

**Table 4: Proposal to make votes more nearly equal in value**

(With seven seven-member electorates, House of Assembly elections, 15 March 2014)

Using the quota-preferential method of proportional representation and grouping the present electorates into seven electorates, the 2014 election can be simulated as follows:

**(A) Election results (if following grouping had been used):**

District	SEAT ONE					Total	Electors Enrolled
	ALP	LIB	GRN	Votes FF	Other		
Chaffey	3 615	14 196	1 199	2 891		21 901	24 576
Finniss	5 166	11 674	2 883	2 361		22 084	24 557
Hammond	5 314	11 469	1 458	1 654	912	20 807	23 340
Heysen	4 527	12 768	4 527		1 192	23 014	25 405
Kavel	4 838	12 116	3 481	1 854		22 289	24 772
Mackillop	3 117	13 794	1 207	1 596	1 505	21 219	23 565
Mount Gambier	2 338	11 100	1 031	1 095	5 872	21 436	23 898
Totals	28 915	87 117	15 786	11 451	9 481	152 750	170 113
Quotas	1.51	4.56	0.83	0.60	0.50		
Members elected*	1	5	1				
Actual members		7					

Quota for election 19,094

Number of electors enrolled 170,113

Number of formal votes 152,750

\* After notional distribution of preferences from OTHER (based on all except for Pegler), the LIB quota is 4.75, ALP 1.64, GRN 0.92 and FF 0.69. Notional distribution of ALP surplus gives GRN a quota and the surplus elects another LIB

District	SEAT TWO					Total	Electors enrolled
	ALP	LIB	GRN	Votes FF	Other		
Flinders	3,214	14,994	1,299	1,313		20,820	23,421
Frome	2,598	8,217	578	1,156	10,342	22,891	25,228
Giles	9,800	7,134	942	1,196		19,072	22,712
Goyder	6,394	11,968	744	1,633	1,542	22,281	24,777
Light	9,919	9,011	1,193	1,355		21,478	23,842
Schubert	5,180	11,922	2,221	2,713		22,036	24,148
Stuart	5,051	13,806	1,035	1,128		21,020	23,595
Totals	42,156	77,052	8,012	10,494	11,884	149,598	167,723
Quotas	2.25	4.12	0.43	0.56	0.64		
Members elected*	2	4			1		
Actual members	2	4			1		

Quota for election 18,700

Number of electors enrolled 167,723

Number of formal votes 149,598

\* Notional distribution of LIB surplus gives ALP 2.27 quotas, GRN 0.44, FF 0.65 and OTHER 0.65. Notional distribution of ALP surplus gives GRN 0.49 quota, FF 0.71 and OTHER 0.81. Notional distribution of GRN preferences gives OTHER the final quota.

Table 4 (continued)

District	SEAT THREE					Total	Electors enrolled
	ALP	LIB	GRN	Votes FF	Other		
Little Para	10,300	7,201	1,459	1,997	954	21,911	25,481
Napier	9,695	6,204	1,708	2,751		20,358	23,653
Playford	11,352	6,779	1,426	2,052		21,609	24,586
Ramsay	11,283	4,988	1,483	2,347		20,101	23,273
Taylor	10,723	6,542	1,448	2,309		21,022	24,006
Wright	9,838	8,685	1,441	1,904	696	22,564	24,960
Totals	63,191	40,399	8,965	13,360	1,650	127,565	145,959
Quotas	3.96	2.53	0.56	0.84	0.10		
Members elected*	4	2		1			
Actual members	6						

(Note: For the purposes of this analysis, both SEATS THREE and SEVEN have been considered to return seven-members, even though there are only six electorates in each. Currently the House of Assembly consists of 47 members, whereas this analysis is based on 49 members (seven seven-member electorates). Under the State's Constitution, each electorate must return the same number of members, hence the divergence from the present 47 members.)

Quota for election	15,946
Number of electors enrolled	145,959
Number of formal votes	127,565

\* After actual distribution of OTHER preferences, ALP quotas are 3.98, LIB 2.55, GRN 0.60 and FF 0.87. After notional distribution of LIB preferences, both ALP and FF received a quota.

District	SEAT FOUR					Total	Electors enrolled
	ALP	LIB	GRN	Votes FF	Other		
Cheltenham	12,060	6,414	1,831	1,470		21,775	24,710
Colton	10,394	10,363	1,584	859		23,200	25,512
Croydon	11,872	5,462	2,342	866		20,542	23,441
Enfield	9,650	6,737	1,599	1,300	591	19,877	23,032
Lee	9,418	8,216	1,794	686	2,882	22,996	25,971
Port Adelaide	11,760	7,330	1,815	1,783		22,688	25,700
West Torrens	10,261	7,295	2,454	894		20,904	23,892
Totals	75,415	51,817	13,419	7,858	3,473	151,982	172,258
Quotas	3.97	2.73	0.71	0.41	0.18		
Members elected*	4	3					
Actual members	7						

Quota for election	18,998
Number of electors enrolled	172,258
Number of formal votes	151,982

\* After notional distribution of preferences from OTHER, and then FF, both ALP and LIB reach the final quota.

Table 4 (continued)

## SEAT FIVE

District	Votes					Total	Electors enrolled
	ALP	LIB	GRN	FF	Other		
Adelaide	7,812	10,543	2,551		748	21,654	24,779
Dunstan	7,881	10,978	2,465		624	21,948	24,581
Florey	8,983	8,317	1,517	1,677		20,494	22,913
Hartley	8,539	10,118	1,804	939		21,400	23,921
Morialta	7,162	12,419	2,033	1,357		22,971	25,375
Newland	9,473	9,269	1,641	1,774		22,157	24,467
Torrens	8,959	8,111	1,853	1,552		20,475	23,294
Totals	58,809	69,755	13,864	7,299	1,372	151,099	169,330
Quotas	3.11	3.69	0.73	0.39	0.07		
Members elected*	3	4					
Actual members	3	4					
Quota for election					18,887		
Number of electors enrolled					169,330		
Number of formal votes					151,099		

\* After actual distribution of OTHER preferences, the ALP quotas become 3.13, LIB 3.71, GRN 0.77 and FF 0.39. With notional distribution of ALP surplus and FF preferences, LIB win the final seat.

## SEAT SIX

District	Votes					Total	Electors enrolled
	ALP	LIB	GRN	FF	Other		
Ashford	8,597	9,335	2,654	841	247	21,674	24,207
Bragg	4,958	15,033	2,891			22,882	25,104
Davenport	6,498	11,581	3,468	1,158		22,705	24,851
Elder	8,350	8,828	1,990	1,035	910	21,113	23,821
Morphett	5,973	12,164	2,128	808		21,073	23,725
Unley	6,429	12,312	2,481	854		22,076	24,450
Waite	6,239	12,585	2,639	868	652	22,983	25,396
Totals	47,044	81,838	18,251	5,564	1,809	154,506	171,554
Quotas	2.44	4.24	0.94	0.29	0.09		
Members elected*	2	4	1				
Actual members	2	5					
Quota for election					19,313		
Number of electors enrolled					171,554		
Number of formal votes					154,506		

\* After actual distribution of OTHER preferences, the ALP quotas become 2.46, LIB 4.25, GRN 0.98 and FF 0.31. Any further distribution of preferences gives the GRN a quota.

Table 4 (continued)

**SEAT SEVEN**

District	Votes					Total	Electors enrolled
	ALP	LIB	GRN	FF	Other		
Bright	8,491	10,780	2,081	852		22,204	24,381
Fisher	4,170	8,249	1,112	936	9,038	23,505	25,808
Kaurna	8,844	6,233	2,041	1,347	1,899	20,364	23,174
Mawson	9,666	8,012	1,843	1,944		21,465	23,969
Mitchell	7,309	7,995	1,473	1,034	4,006	21,817	24,185
Reynell	10,434	6,539	1,734	2,294		21,001	23,965
Totals	48,914	47,808	10,284	8,407	14,943	130,356	145,482
Quotas	3.00	2.93	0.63	0.52	0.92		
Members elected*	3	3			1		
Actual members	3	2			1		

(See Note under SEAT THREE for explanation of difference between actual members and members elected).

Quota for election	16,295
Number of electors enrolled	145,482
Number of formal votes	130,356

\* After notional distribution of FF preferences, LIB and OTHER win the final positions.

**(B) Voter representation**

The outcome of the election, if the districts had been grouped as shown, can be summarised as follows:

Seat	Effective votes	Ineffective votes	Total votes
1	141,264	11,486	152,750
2	137,034	12,564	149,598
3	117,106	10,459	127,565
4	137,690	14,292	151,982
5	132,336	18,763	151,099
6	148,608	5,898	154,506
7	120,072	10,284	130,356
Whole State	934,110	83,746	1,017,856
Effective representation	91.8%		
WASTED VOTES	8.2%		



TABLE 4 (continued)

**(C) Party representation**

Seat	ALP	LIB	GRN	FF	Other
1	1	5	1		
2	2	4			1 (IND)
3	4	2		1	
4	4	3			
5	3	4			
6	2	4	1		
7	3	3			1 (IND)
Whole State	19	25	2	1	2
Members expected in proportion to votes	18	22	4	3	2
Actual members	23	22			2

NOTE: The grouping in Table 4 gives only a first approximation to the problem of how to achieve "one vote, one value". This demonstrates the electoral justice and the practicality of using multi-member electorates each returning the same number of members.

**Table 5: Proposal to make votes more nearly equal in value**  
(With nine five-member electorates, House of Assembly, 15 March 2014)

Using calculations similar to those in Table 4, and by grouping the present electorates into nine electorates, the results of the 2014 election can also be simulated and summarised as follows:

(A) Election results (if following grouping had been used)

Seat	Districts	Members elected				
		ALP	LIB	GRN	FF	Other
1	Chaffey, Finniss, Hammond, MacKillop, Mount Gambier, Schubert	1	3	0	0	1
2	Flinders, Frome, Giles, Goyder, Light, Stuart	2	3	0	0	0
3	Little Para, Napier, Ramsay, Taylor, Wright	3	2	0	0	0
4	Cheltenham, Colton, Croydon, Lee, Port Adelaide	3	2	0	0	0
5	Enfield, Florey, Hartley, Playford, Torrens	3	2	0	0	0
6	Ashford, Elder, Mitchell, Morphett, West Torrens	2	2	1	0	0
7	Adelaide, Bragg, Dunstan, Unley, Waite	2	3	0	0	0
8	Bright, Fisher, Kaurna, Mawson, Reynell	2	2	0	0	1
9	Davenport, Heysen, Kavel, Morialta, Newland	1	3	1	0	0
<b>PARTY REPRESENTATION</b>		19	22	2	0	2
Members expected in proportion to votes		17	19	4	3	2

(B) Voter Representation

The outcome of the election, if the districts had been grouped as shown, can be summarised as follows:

Seat	Total Votes	Effective Votes	Ineffective Votes
1	129,483	110,201	19,282
2	127,562	106,773	20,789
3	105,956	91,578	14,378
4	111,201	93,289	17,912
5	103,855	90,761	13,094
6	106,581	89,705	16,876
7	111,543	95,060	16,483
8	108,539	91,066	17,473
9	113,136	97,986	15,150
<b>Whole State</b>	<b>1,0017,856</b>	<b>866,419</b>	<b>151,437</b>
		Effective representation	85.1%
		Wasted Votes	14.9%

NOTE: The grouping in Table 5 gives another example of how multi-member electorates could replace single-member electorates. However, in comparing five-member and seven-member electorates the latter gives both a better party representation and a more effective elector representation.

## **Appendix 1: The quota-preferential method of proportional representation**

The quota-preferential method is based on the idea that a candidate must have the support of a “quota” of voters to be elected. The method is also known as the single-transferable-vote method and in Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory as the Hare-Clark method. Voting is preferential. In some applications, voters are required to indicate preferences for all candidates but this requirement is unnecessary for the working of the method and is an unwarranted interference with the choice of the voter.

The quota is calculated so that it is just possible to form a number of quotas equal to the number of vacancies. If, for example there are seven vacancies, the quota is the whole number just greater than one-eighth of the total number of votes. When seven quotas have been formed, they amount to more than seven-eighths of the total, and the remaining votes are less than an eighth. The quota for any number of vacancies is the whole number next above the quotient found by dividing the total number of votes by the number next above the number of vacancies.

If it should happen that candidates equal in number to the number of vacancies were each supported by a quota of voters, these candidates would be elected and the election would be complete. It is more usual for some candidates, numbering less than the number of vacancies, to have first-preference totals greater than the quota. These candidates are elected and their surplus votes are transferred to the candidates shown on the voting papers, as second or next-available preferences. The transfer of these papers may bring the totals of other candidates up to or above the quota and if so, these candidates are elected and any surplus votes are transferred. If there are vacancies unfilled when all surpluses have been transferred, the candidate with the smallest total is excluded and the voting papers credited to that candidate are transferred to the candidates shown as next preferences among the “continuing candidates”, that is, those who are neither elected nor excluded. These processes are continued until all the vacancies are filled each by a candidate supported by a quota.

With this method, any group of voters as large as a quota is assured of representation by the candidate of their choice. If a group amounts to two or more quotas, it will elect the corresponding number of candidates as its representatives. The choice of the candidates who become representatives is made by the voters themselves through their preference indications. It is worth noting that in Tasmania and the ACT, numbered “how to vote” cards are not used and the candidates are listed and rotated in random order. The parties invite their supporters to vote in order of their own choice. The result is that most voters see the election of the candidates they prefer as their representatives. Most of those whose first-preference candidates are not elected see the election of other candidates high in their order of preference. A high level of voter satisfaction is assured and each coherent group of voters is represented in proportion to its numbers – thus the term “proportional representation”.

The quota-preferential method gives voters freedom of choice between candidates associated with a wide range of political views, ensures that most of the voters see the election of candidates who are acceptable to them as representatives, and gives effective representation to both majorities and minorities. Although no method can meet the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights perfectly, the quota-preferential method comes closer to doing this than any other method. By making elected bodies unmistakably responsible to the voters as a whole, it encourages governments to enact legislation of the kind wanted by the people. At the same time it removes most of the possibilities for minority pressure groups to exercise undue influence on governments.

**Appendix 2: Andrew Evan's Address-in-Reply contribution in State Parliament on 8 May 2006.**

*This speech provides a good explanation on why Hare-Clark should be introduced for the House of Assembly.*

If the parliament is considering reforms to the upper house, it should also consider reforming the lower house. We must be open to examining the parliamentary system of other jurisdictions and adopt best practice in our state. In South Australia it is unfortunate that most elections leave many people unrepresented in respect of the House of Assembly. Only some votes help to elect candidates, and others have no effect and are, essentially, wasted. This result can mean that parties supported by only a minority of voters overall can win a majority of seats. As it stands, if an elector votes Liberal in an electorate where a Labor candidate wins, or alternatively, if an elector votes Labor and a Liberal candidate wins, their votes is, in essence, irrelevant. The House of Assembly should reflect the votes of each constituent, which at present is obviously not the case.

The introduction of proportional presentation is, in my opinion, the best way to maximise the effectiveness of all votes that are cast, resulting in the election of parliaments that most closely reflect the wishes of the electorate at large. The Hare-Clark system of voting has been used in Tasmania for more than a century. It is a single, transferable method of proportional voting, where a ballot paper moves between the candidates as determined by the elector's preferences. It was named after English lawyers Sir Thomas Hare, who developed a proportional representation system in 1859, and Andrew Inglis Clark, who was the attorney-general between 1887 and 1892, and again between 1894 and 1897. Clark modified Hare's system and was responsible for its introduction in Tasmania.

Under the Hare-Clark system, parties, groups and independents are elected to the House of Assembly in proportion to their support in the electorate. The composition of the house closely reflects the proportion of primary votes on a state-wide basis. There are many reasons to adopt the Hare-Clark voting system in our state parliament's lower house. For example, voting in the system is simple: you vote only for the number of seats that need to be filled. You are always given a choice of party candidates. It does not ensure safe seats for candidates. It always provides an opposition. In single member electorates, where one issue can dominate, most of, if not all, the seats can be won by one party. This is very unlikely to occur under Hare-Clark. Up to 95 per cent of votes are used to elect candidates. It allows voters to be represented by the party's candidate of their choice. It gives each party, or group, representation corresponding to its voting strength.

A party may lose sitting members, but they may be replaced by members of the same party chosen by the people, with party numbers remaining intact. With Hare-Clark, a party can advertise its policies, and then the voters exercise choice as to the best candidate within the electorate to carry out that policy. It is no wonder that it has been referred to as the most democratic system of voting used in the world today.